Introduction: Eastphalia Emerging?: Asia, International Law, and Global Governance by Fidler, David
Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 1
Winter 2010
Introduction: Eastphalia Emerging?: Asia,
International Law, and Global Governance
David Fidler
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dfidler@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fidler, David (2010) "Introduction: Eastphalia Emerging?: Asia, International Law, and Global Governance," Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies: Vol. 17: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol17/iss1/1
Introduction
Eastphalia Emerging?:
Asia, International Law, and
Global Governance
DAVID P. FIDLER*
I. FROM WESTPHALIA TO EASTPHALIA
In the late eighteenth century, as part of his effort to stop British
imperial despoliation of India, Edmund Burke argued that the people
and civilization of India were moral equals of Europe, deserving of
British respect rather than rapacious exploitation. "I assert," Burke
argued, "that their morality is equal to ours as regards the morality of
Governors, fathers, superiors; and I challenge the world to shew, in any
modern European book, more true morality and wisdom than is to be
found in the writings of Asiatic men in high trusts, and who have been
Counsellors to Princes."1 Burke further argued that "in Asia as well as
in Europe the same Law of Nations applies, the same principles
continually resorted to, and the same maxims sacredly held and
strenuously maintained" and that "Asia is enlightened in that respect as
well as Europe."2 Burke's words fell on deaf ears; British imperialism in
India proceeded apace. In the nineteenth century, other Asian cultures
and states of ancient origin, especially China and Japan, found their
traditional cultural and political practices determined by Western
* Faculty Editor for the Symposium; James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington; Director, Indiana University
Center on American and Global Security. I would like to thank Hannah Buxbaum, Scott
Kennedy, Ethan Michelson, and Virginia Ho for their advice and assistance in putting this
symposium together.
1. Edmund Burke, Speech on Opening of Impeachment (Feb. 16, 1788), in 6 THE
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE-INDIA: THE LAUNCHING OF THE HASTINGS
IMPEACHMENT, 1786-1788, 312, 361 (P. J. Marshall ed., 1991).
2. Id. at 367.
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imperial powers to be "uncivilized' 3 and subject to dramatic changes at
the hands of European nations and commercial interests. The twentieth
century witnessed Asian countries emerge from colonialism into
independent, sovereign states, but they often faced political and
economic challenges in international affairs from a position of
weakness. Not long ago, Asia's subjugation, exploitation, and
vulnerability through its incorporation into the modern international
system made the idea that Asian countries would one day reshape
international politics from a position of strength a very distant dream.
The world may, however, be on the cusp of this possibility becoming
reality. For a number of years, commentators on global affairs have
been watching and analyzing the so-called "rise of Asia," a phenomenon
largely driven by strong economic growth and development in India,
China, East Asia, and Southeast Asia over the past twenty to thirty
years. This perceived shift of material power and influence toward Asia
provides Asian countries with their first real opportunity to significantly
affect the structure and dynamics of international relations. This
symposium attempts to provide insights into how this Asian opportunity
might affect international law and global governance in twenty-first-
century world politics.
Scholars of international politics and international law mark the
beginnings of the modern international system with the Peace of
Westphalia of 1648, which ended brutal wars Europeans had fought
with each other for decades. The system of independent, sovereign
states that developed after these wars ended came to be known as the
'Westphalian" system. Asian countries and peoples were incorporated
into this Westphalian system through European and Western
imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The world
turned Westphalian as it became organized into territorial states
possessing sovereignty and interacting through consent-based rules
called the 'law of nations" or, later, international law. The history of
international law is largely a story written by Western countries, which
extended the reach of this law to every corner of the earth and
dominated the substantive nature of the rules and the institutions
designed to support them.
After the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of the latest
phase of globalization, experts began to speak of the world entering a
"post-Westphalian" period. The end of the ideological conflict between
the United States and the Soviet Union and the border-busting impact
of globalization began to make central features of the Westphalian
3. See, e.g., GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF 'CIVILIZATION' IN INTERNATIONAL
SocIETY (1984).
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system, especially the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention in
the domestic affairs of other states, look outdated and reactionary. In
this post-Westphalian context, state and nonstate actors, predominantly
from the West, began devising collective action mechanisms that went
beyond traditional international law, leading many commentators to
analyze the rise of "global governance."
This symposium poses the question whether the rise of Asia in
global affairs might presage the emergence of an "Eastphalian" world
order. The concept of "Eastphalia" attempts to capture the potential for
Asian countries to reshape international politics, which have been long
dominated by the influence, interests, and ideas of the West, in ways
that reflect Asian power, principles, and practices more clearly. The
possibility that an Eastphalian order might emerge under the impact of
Asia's growing power and influence does not mean that Asian countries,
especially China and India, will dominate the world through some form
of Asian hegemony. Instead, the concept of Eastphalia is designed to
focus attention on how the rise of Asia will affect international politics,
international law, and global governance in the early twenty-first
century. What will Asian-influenced world politics look like, and what
roles will international law and global governance play in an Asian-
centric world?
II. SYMPOSIUM CONTRIBUTIONS
To explore these questions, the Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies invited scholars and experts from Asia and the United States to
explore aspects of the potential impact of Asia's growing importance in
international relations. The contributions represent a rich set of
analyses that consider, among other things, conceptual implications for
world affairs of Asia's rise to prominence; the importance of the
behavior of the Asian great powers-China, India, and Japan; the
impact of Asian power and ideas on the future of high-profile post-
Westphalian norms; and the response of key Asian states to challenges
presented by globalized problems. However impressive, the articles in
this symposium do not exhaust the questions raised by the prospect of
Asian countries reshaping international relations, and the symposium's
intent is to stimulate additional critical analysis and speculation about
where Asia's ascendance might be taking world affairs.
We begin the symposium with two articles that explore conceptual
and general implications of the rise of Asian countries in international
relations. Professor Chang-fa Lo of National Taiwan University
analyzes China's emergence as a great power and the ideas China
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promotes and practices in its foreign policy and international relations.
Although China's development into a great power is commonly accepted,
Professor Lo argues that the ideas preferred by Chinese leaders,
particularly the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Five
Principles), are neither distinctively Asian nor particularly helpful for
states, international organizations, and nonstate actors trying to
address transnational problems caused or exacerbated by globalization.
Professor Lo argues that "[flor Eastphalia to be something distinct,
China must propose and practice ideas beyond the Five Principles that
appeal to a wide spectrum of states and generate benefits for people in a
globalized world."5
Professor Tom Ginsburg of the University of Chicago Law School
addresses similar themes in his contribution to the symposium.
6
Professor Ginsburg centers his analysis about the impact of Asia's rise,
and particularly the role of China in that rise, within larger conceptual
debates about the direction world affairs may take. For example, he
compares what may emerge in an Asian-dominated world with the
governance trends seen within the European Union. For Professor
Ginsburg, Asia's increasing importance represents a challenge to the
globalization of Western-led universalism and European-led
constitutionalism because Asian countries currently show little to no
inclination to follow these directions in their relations with each other
or the wider world. In light of this situation, he asks whether the leader
of the Burmese political opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi, should be
worried about the impact of a more powerful China and Asia on the rest
of the world. According to Professor Ginsburg, how Asia, and
particularly China, might influence international relations is not clear,
and multiple possibilities exist, including the following one:
Even if East Asia emerges as the single dominant region
of the world, a convergence in preferences may also
occur such that Eastphalia reflects current European
trends toward global constitutionalism. . . . This
possibility would require an acceleration of integration
in Asia itself and the adoption of a set of norms and
preferences among peoples of the region that is
compatible with the constitutionalist vision. It is a vision
of convergence, in which Asian values become European
4. Chang-fa Lo, Values to Be Added to an "Eastphalian Order" by the Emerging
China, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 13 (2010).
5. Id. at 25.
6. Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 27 (2010).
INTRODUCTION
values and vice versa. It is a vision that Aung San Suu
Kyi could live with, as could many of us.
7
The next symposium contribution comes from Professor Men
Honghua, Deputy Director of the Center of International Strategic
Studies of the Party School of CPC Central Committee in Beijing,
China. Professor Men's article argues that a critical component of the
future contributions Asia can make to world affairs is the strategic
relationship between Japan and China.8 Professor Men applies the
literature about regional order formation to the Sino-Japanese
relationship, and he discusses the five key dynamics of the evolving
order in East Asia: (1) regional economic integration and its spillover
effects, (2) China's comprehensive and peaceful rise, (3) Japan's pursuit
of greater political roles in the world and the region, (4) the leading role
and normative influence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and (5) the strategic adjustments being made by the United
States. He analyzes imbalances in the region that might affect the
future of order in East Asia, and he proposes a "common interests-based
framework" 9 to help improve Sino-Japanese relations, regional order in
East Asia, and the potential for Asia to play a more influential role in
the world. He concludes: "For China and Japan, this vision is not only a
great challenge, but it is also an unprecedented opportunity. Great
nations must think before they act. It is high time for China and Japan
to think more clearly about their interests and responsibilities
nationally, regionally, and globally, and begin to act on strategic choices
that will benefit their people, Asia, and the entire world."'
In contrast to Professor Men's detailed analysis of order in East
Asia, Sung Won Kim's contribution examines how the rise of Asia, and
China in particular, might affect the normative concept of "human
security."" Kim, who works in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
of the Republic of Korea, reviews the ideas informing the human
security norm, and he considers the prospects for Asia to become a
region of potentially cutting-edge work on human security: "Asia today
contains the best of the first world and the worst of the third world,
which makes the region such a fascinating potential laboratory for
7. Id. at 45.
8. Men Honghua, East Asian Order Formation and Sino-Japanese Relations, 17 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (2010).
9. Id. at 75.
10. Id. at 82.
11. Sung Won Kim, Human Security with an Asian Face?, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 83 (2010).
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global governance on human security."' 2 This promise, however, is
undercut by Asian countries' embrace of strong principles of sovereignty
and nonintervention, which run counter to the thrust of the human
security norm. Kim explores whether Confucianism might provide an
Asian philosophical perspective to support Asian leadership on human
security. In the end, though, Kim expresses concern about the impact of
Asia's rise on the norm of human security, and he concludes that "the
Asian approach to international relations and the prevailing post-
Westphalian nature of the human security concept do not share much, if
any, common ground. In short, the Asian perspective offers little for
advocates of human security to embrace."'3
The next contribution comes from Professor Yanzhong Huang of
Seton Hall University, who analyzes how global health has become part
of China's foreign policy thinking. '4 Professor Huang's article provides a
detailed analysis of how China, a rising Asian great power, has
addressed global health challenges in its foreign policy historically and
in the contemporary era. His analysis is valuable because he explores in
depth how China has adjusted its foreign policy thinking to address the
increasingly globalized threat infectious diseases pose. In particular,
Professor Huang demonstrates the significant impact China's
mishandling of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak
in 2003 had on its policy makers. After SARS, Professor Huang argues,
China has exhibited a new approach to health as a foreign policy issue,
including (1) being more transparent and cooperative, (2) showing
greater interest in multilateralism in global health, (3) reinvigorating
its health diplomacy in Africa, and (4) making Southeast Asia a new
priority for its health diplomacy. This article is also valuable because it
provides one of the few fine-grained analyses of how the relationship
between health and foreign policy has developed in a major power in the
international system. However, Professor Huang cautions against
getting too excited about the new version of Chinese health diplomacy.
He concludes that, "[a]lthough China recognizes that solutions to global
health problems necessitate neoliberal strategies of cooperation over
disease prevention and control, its actions on global health problems are
still justified from the lens of classical realism that focuses on power,
influence, and security."'
5
12. Id. at 101.
13. Id. at 102.
14. Yanzhong Huang, Pursuing Health as Foreign Policy: The Case of China, 17 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (2010).
15. Id. at 145.
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The final symposium contribution is written by Professors David P.
Fidler and Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University, and focuses on India.'
6
We trace India's development into an emerging Asian great power and
analyze how India's rise to geopolitical prominence might affect the
nature of an Asian-centric international system. Like China and the
member states of ASEAN, India embraces the Five Principles as
normative concepts that guide its foreign policy and relations with other
nations. The Five Principles have not, however, provided India with
clear guidance as to how its leaders should shape and use India's
growing power and influence. We argue that Indian policy makers
exhibit indecisiveness at this key turning point in India's role in world
politics. We also point out that at least two paths are possible for India
in terms of the emergence of an Eastphalian order: India could become
irrelevant or it could become indispensable in the unfolding process of
Asia's impact on international relations. We conclude:
India's role in the possible coming of an Eastphalian
order is enigmatic for many reasons, including the
paradox of India's commitment to democracy internally
and its dedication to strong principles of sovereignty and
noninterference internationally. This situation creates
confusion and potential conceptual obstacles for Indian
development of distinctive contributions to the operation
of legal rules and governance mechanisms in
Eastphalia.'
7
III. THEMES FROM THE SYMPOSIUM CONTRIBUTIONS
The symposium contributions, collectively, raise a number of themes
that illuminate how the rise of Asia might affect international law and
global governance. These themes provide insights into what an
Eastphalian international order might look like, how it might operate,
and where it might have weaknesses. These insights remain, of course,
speculative because, in international politics, reality often turns out
different from prognostication, but the effort to peer, however dimly,
into the future can produce some awareness of what might transpire.
16. David P. Fidler & Sumit Ganguly, India and Eastphalia, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 147 (2010).
17. Id. at 163.
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A. Structural Influences on International Law and Global Governance:
Asia's Rise and Multipolarity
The symposium articles reflect a theme seen in other literature
about the rise of Asia-the impact the emergence of China and India as
great powers will have on the structure of the international system. The
post-Westphalian international system began in earnest with the end of
the Cold War and was dominated by Western countries, particularly the
United States. The system was often described as "unipolar,"
"hegemonic," or "quasi-hegemonic" because of the predominance of U.S.
power and influence. With China and India developing into great
powers, the rise of Asia might make multipolarity the structural
characteristic of the next phase of the international system's evolution.
Multipolarity last characterized the structure of the international
system in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth
century, but the great powers in these periods were, except for Japan,
all Western countries. The new multipolarity that might arise through
China's and India's emergence as great powers will mark the first time
that Asian countries help determine key structural features of the
international system.
The structure of the international system affects how states,
international organizations, and nonstate actors utilize international
law and global governance. Some of the structural impact relates to the
scope and substance of international law and global governance
mechanisms (see below), but structural change can also affect the
environment in which such law and mechanisms operate. For example,
multipolarity might make reaching effective collective action among
states more difficult because it becomes harder to get multiple great
powers to have converging interests and agree to common approaches.
The U.S. National Intelligence Council has referred to this possible
context as reflecting "multipolarity without multilateralism. 18
This effect is a function of structure and does not reflect anything
distinctively Asian, even though the structural change occurs because of
the shift of material power and influence toward Asian countries. In
short, the emergence of multipolarity through China's and India's
development into great powers might make the political conditions in
which states, international organizations, and nonstate actors use
international law and global governance mechanisms more difficult,
potentially limiting the amount of effective collective action against
existing or newly emerging regional or global problems that can be
18. U.S. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE CoUNcIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD
81 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/
2025_GlobalTrendsFinalReport.pdf.
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achieved.
As the multipolar international systems of the nineteenth century
and the first half of the twentieth century suggest, structural
multipolarity can create suspicion, distrust, and competition for
influence among the great powers. Tensions between the great powers
of the first decades of the twenty-first century might also arise, further
limiting the potential for international cooperation on regional and
global problems. Some potential difficulties resulting from the
international system getting crowded with more rival powers can be
glimpsed in the problems created by the changing relationship between
China, as the emerging Asian power, and Japan, the traditional
economic powerhouse of the region. Challenges created by a multipolar
system might manifest themselves, for example, in the politics within
the Group of Twenty (G-20), which replaced the Western-dominated
Group of Eight (G-8) in 2009 as the leading global forum for economic
policy.
B. Scope and Substance of International Law and Global Governance:
Whither the Five Principles?
Another theme that emerges from the symposium contributions is
the possibility that a multipolar system more heavily influenced by
Asian countries might affect the scope and substance of international
law and global governance. As many articles in the symposium note,
Asian countries place significant value on the Five Principles in their
relations with each other and with countries outside of the Asian region,
such as in Africa. 9 The Five Principles are more state-centric and
conservative than the more universalistic and interventionist ideas and
norms Western countries espoused after the end of the Cold War. Asian
emphasis on sovereignty and nonintervention does not mean that Asian
countries fail to participate in international legal regimes (e.g., trade
agreements) and global governance mechanisms (e.g., the International
Health Regulations 2005), so the rise in political importance of the Five
Principles does not signal the end of the utility of international law and
global governance. However, whether Asian commitment to the Five
Principles might limit the scope and substance of international law and
global governance in the new multipolar system is a relevant question.
Thinking about this question must reflect the probability that Asian
use of the Five Principles in the future will likely not resemble Asian
use of the principles during decolonization and the Cold War. In those
19. See Fidler & Ganguly, supra note 16, at 156; Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 32; Kim,
supra note 11, at 95; Lo, supra note 4, at 15.
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earlier times, the Five Principles were deployed mainly in a defensive
manner by Asian countries that were weak politically and economically
and vulnerable to outside pressure and interference from stronger
states. Although concerns about outside intervention have not
disappeared, as evidenced by China and India continuing to bristle over
human rights criticisms, the stronger Asian countries, such as those
members of the G-20 (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, and South
Korea), no longer equate, for example, economic interdependence with
threats of foreign intervention.
Asian countries and societies have become more globalized through
their choices to integrate into global markets for goods, services,
technologies, and investment capital. The most dramatic examples of
change in this regard are, of course, China and India, both of which for
decades after the Second World War avoided interconnections with
other countries in favor of autarkic political and economic development.
Now China's and India's emerging power and influence come from
following policies that reject autarky in favor of deeper levels of political
cooperation and economic interdependence. In addition, Asian countries
also realize their vulnerability to many global problems, such as the
spread of infectious diseases, global financial crises, and the dangers of
climate change, which require serious levels of international
cooperation. The globalization of Asian policy making now makes Asian
countries less wary about collective action from the perspective of the
Five Principles than once they were.
Nevertheless, the legacy of Asian commitment to the Five
Principles, combined with the frequency with which Asian countries
continue to appeal to these principles, means that these norms will
constitute more than empty rhetoric in an international system more
heavily influenced by Asia. As noted in a number of the symposium
articles, the continued importance of the Five Principles creates
difficulties for human rights, the concept of human security, democracy
promotion, and the idea of humanitarian intervention, including in its
latest manifestation as the principle of the responsibility to protect.
Both India and China highlight the Five Principles in their increasing
activities in Africa, and ASEAN members continue to emphasize these
principles (e.g., with respect to Myanmar), even as they have moved
tentatively toward a regional human rights process. Weaker countries
in Asia still embrace the Five Principles as potential ammunition
against any temptations stronger Asian powers, especially China and
India, might have to throw their political weight around.
Thus, one of the most important and interesting things to watch as
power and influence continue to shift toward Asia is how Asian
countries adapt their commitment to the Five Principles to the
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opportunities and challenges a multipolar, Asian-influenced, and
globalizing international system will create. The nature of this
adaptation will affect how countries utilize international law and global
governance mechanisms in an Eastphalian system and what
substantive innovations in such law and mechanisms, if any, will arise
in the future.
C. Sustainability of Eastphalia: Rise and Fall of Asian Influence and
Ideas?
A final theme worth mentioning asks whether the rise of Asian
power and influence will be sustained and generate more permanent
changes in the nature of international relations. European great powers
had such an impact during their heyday in the nineteenth century and
the first half of the twentieth century, and the United States did
likewise during its superpower and quasi-hegemonic moments in the
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Whether Asian countries can
sustain their current rise to prominence over time and in ways that
reshape world affairs remains to be seen, but many questions exist
about the probability of this outcome.
Asian rivalries might deepen and increasingly pit Asian countries
against each other, draining notions of Asian solidarity of any import. In
addition, as Kim argues in his article, Asia experiences the best of the
first world and the worst of the third world across its immense
geographical extent. The gap between these two worlds might expand
within Asia and within Asian countries, undermining their ability to
maintain the political, economic, and social growth and stability that
has made the world turn its eyes toward Asia. Similarly, China and
India face enormous domestic problems that might sap their means and
willingness to shoulder the responsibilities and burdens of being a great
power in an Asian-centric international system. Or, as Ginsburg posits,
Asian countries may find their interests and ideas converging with
those developed by the West, such that Asia again becomes a follower
and adapter of Western ways rather than being a source of a distinctive
approach to international relations, international law, and global
governance.
CONCLUSION
The articles in this symposium provide much food for thought with
respect to the potential impact of the rise of Asia on the structure of the
international system, the scope and substance of international law and
global governance, and the sustainability of Asian influence, interests,
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and ideas in world affairs. The possibility of the emergence of an
Eastphalian international system remains just that-a possibility. But,
it is a possibility permeated with potentially historic implications as
Asian countries are, for the first time since the modern international
system emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century and went global
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, poised to shape
international relations according to their interests, influence, and ideas.
Asia stands on the threshold of an opportunity that aims not for the
recognition of Asia's moral equivalence and enlightenment that Edmund
Burke tried to emphasize in a bygone age, but rather for Asian countries
to show leadership in how the governance of human affairs will unfold
in the coming decades. What Asian countries make of this
unprecedented confluence of events may well be one of the most
important tales to emerge from the triumphs and travails of the twenty-
first century.
